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Human teleological intentionality represents the biggest challenge to a 
Darwinian metatheoretical framework including socio-economic domain. 
In order to face the problem, this paper introduces an auxiliary 
hypothesis: the human will has to be considered as a constitutive 
component of the socio-economic environment. This means that the 
human will is the place where evolutionary socio-economic events occur. 
This perspective absorbs the objection that Continuity Hypothesis theory 
addresses to Generalized Darwinism. 	
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According to an old Veblenian claim, the socio-economic reality depends on 
institutions subjected to Darwinian evolutionary forces. In 1898, Veblen 
explicitly recognized Darwin’s authority and reproached scholars of both 
Classical and Historical Schools for missing the appointment with modern 
science: 
 
The economists of the classical trend have made no serious attempt to 
depart from the standpoint of taxonomy and make their science a genetic 
account of the economic life process. As has just been said, much the 
same is true for the Historical School. The latter have attempted an 
account of developmental sequence, but they have followed the lines of 
pre-Darwinian speculations on development rather than lines that modern 
science would recognize as evolutionary. They have given a narrative 
survey of phenomena, not a genetic account of an unfolding process. 
(Veblen, 1898, p.388) 
 
Veblen was not the only one to bring Darwinism outside of the biological field. 
For example, James (1890) exported Darwinian insights in the fields of 
psychology, and Baldwin (1909) and Dewey (1965 [1910]) showed Darwinian 
influence on philosophy. It was the James’ philosophy, in turn inspired by the 
Darwinian logic, that induced Veblen to establish the pair habit-instinct at the 
very foundation of his institutional approach (Camic and Hodgson, 2010). 
Darwin himself had legitimated these attempts by offering several parallelisms 
between living beings and human language, each of which yet belong to clearly 
distinct domains: see Darwin (1860 [1859], pp. 40, 422; 1871, I, pp. 57, 58, 
104, 174, 181).  
Nevertheless, the Veblenian followers soon dismissed the Darwinian legacy. 
Hodgson (2004) and Rutherford (2011) describe the reasons for such 
abandonment. Over time the stigma of social Darwinism worried the scholars, 
and the attribute “Darwinian” could hardly match something different from 
strictly biological issues. It needed to wait for the second half of the twentieth 
century, when the first organic attempts to generalize the Darwinian logic 
started. Campbell (1970) proposed natural selection as a real epistemological 
model and Dawkins (1983) coined the phrase “Universal Darwinism” to name 
the systematic extension of Darwinism beyond the traditional biological 
boundaries. 
Hodgson (2002) reconnects these endeavours to make Darwinism general with 
the Veblenian insights. The resulting proposal consists in shifting Darwinism 
from being only the place where good analogies may be found, to being the 
ontological premise underlying evolution in a number of distinct domains, 
including the socio-economic one. In this view, Darwinism would be “a 
compelling ontology”, “a universal metatheory in which specific theories must 
be nested” (Hodgson 2002, p. 27). In order to do so it was necessary to identify 
an essential core of Darwinian elements able to explain the evolution within 
fields of reality that are distinct but yet show certain communalities. The 
resulting metatheoretical framework is known as Generalized Darwinism 
(GD), according to which, the Darwinian explanation of the biological world 
would be just the implementation of that metatheoretical framework into the 
biological domain. The fact that the first systematic description of the 
evolutionary forces has concerned the living beings, and not something as the 
human language, for example, could be either just a coincidence or more likely 
the consequence of the large quantity of available data: after all, organisms 
have left traces of themselves for billions of years on Earth. 
The main conceptual challenges of such an approach are likely to account for 
the role that the teleologically oriented human will plays in it. Differently from 
the biological domain, indeed, the socio-economic one is an epistemic reality 
that cannot exist without human acceptance (Searle, 2005). The related 
objection does not coincide with the debate on whether social evolution is 
natural or not: Hodgson (2002) solves the problem in the sense that the so-
called “artificial” selection does not fall outside the “natural” one. Rather, the 
question concerns the peculiarities of human agency, which represents 
something of unparalleled in the known universe. Is the appearance of such 
peculiarities an exception that prevents the Darwinian scheme from being 
applied to a domain where human agency is so decisive? 
The present paper takes the argument one step further and proposes a 
change in the perspective: it considers the human intervention neither as a force 
able to interfere with the Darwinian mechanisms of evolution nor as something 
that has just to be explained by means of Darwinian mechanisms. Rather, the 
human agency, and specifically the human intentionality, is considered here as 
part of the environment for the socio-economic evolution. In these terms, 
intentionality is something whose changes the evolutionary agents have to 
adapt to in order to survive and replicate. Such an approach allows wholly 
overcoming the ostensible contradiction related to the presence of a 
teleological will into a generalized Darwinian mechanism. Such an assumption 
appears as one of those auxiliary hypotheses that the GD proponents and 
opponents wish for in order to fit the metatheoretical framework into specific 
socio-economic domain. 
The paper is organized as follows. The next section describes GD in detail; the 
third section discusses the human intentionality as an objection to its validity; 




2. The Generalized Darwinism 
 
Hodgson (2002) and Knudsen (2002) lay the foundations for identifying 
an ontological connection among different areas of reality. By virtue of 
this connection, the Darwinian logic would explain any evolutionary 
paths in those areas, no matter the specificities of domains where those 
paths occur. Thus, social scientists can employ Darwinism to explain 
events, as biologists do, despite the deep differences of details between 
their respective fields. 
Knudsen (2002) moves from the seminal works of Alchian (1950) and 
Nelson and Winter (1982) to suggest that economic evolutionism should 
embody the same causal structure that Darwinism shows. Hodgson 
(2002) finds in Darwinian causality the bedrock for an ontology 
underlying a plurality of domains. As the title of the paper makes 
immediately explicit, his aim is to shift the use of Darwinism in 
economics from analogy to ontology: Darwinism would not only be a 
treasure trove for appealing examples but, at a high level of abstraction, 
something underlying both the biological and the non-biological 
domains. This line of reasoning results in Hodgson and Knudsen (2006), 
where the authors reject some of the most common objections to the use 
of Darwinism in social sciences. Most importantly, by following the 
argument of Campbell (1965), they suggest that variation, inheritance, 
and selection are the very essential elements for a metatheoretical 
framework, which they rename Generalized Darwinism (GD). Of course, 
different domains greatly differ in details. For example, the replication 
mechanisms deeply differ between, let’s say, a routine and a goldfinch; 
even, domains can differ within themselves: replication mechanisms also 
differ between goldfinch and bacteria. In spite of such differences, 
however, whereby an evolutionary path arises, a Darwinian core of 
principles can account for that. 
The differences among domains call for the identification of auxiliary 
hypotheses, which are appropriate to the different fields of reality where 
evolutionary forces perform their own task. The aim of assuming 
auxiliary hypotheses for each domain is that of allowing the Darwinian 
essential core to take concrete shape in different concrete circumstances. 
Therefore, alongside an essential set of Darwinian elements, a number of 
detail assumptions is needed in order to adapt the general principles to 
variegated domains. 
As a reply to those criticisms (Buenstorf, 2006 and Cordes, 2006) that 
consider Darwinian evolutionism as inappropriate to social domain, 
Aldrich et al. (2008) offer a systematization of such metatheoretical 
framework. Firstly, they establish that complex population systems are 
the phenomena that the attention of evolutionary scholars has to be 
addressed to. As biology is not the only field that considers such systems, 
it is neither the only one that can be studied in Darwinian terms. 
Secondly, the GD considers populations consisting of several agents that 
share characteristics, which make them similar under many respects. All 
the members belonging to a population substantially differ from all the 
members belonging to other populations. Despite the substantial 
similarity of the members belonging to the same population, they do 
differ in some degree from one another. Thirdly, two sets of core 
Darwinian principles are identified: the three steps of evolution namely 
inheritance, variation, and selection on one hand, and the replicator-
interactor pair (following Hull, 1988) on the other one. On the 
assumption that both these sets are sufficiently general, a metatheoretical 
framework arises, which underlies different domains. 
The concept of inheritance refers to the ability of the agents to retain 
(descent) and pass on (replication) those characteristics that ensure them 
an adaptive success. In particular, replication is the ability of the agents 
to make copies of themselves. Being this replicative process not perfect, 
the variation step arises. Selection, finally, is the result of the differential 
adaptation of varied agents to the environment, which, in the meantime, 
can vary. 
The replicator-interactor pair derives from generalization of the 
genotype-phenotype biological pair. Replicator is any entity that makes 
imperfect copies of itself and, in doing so, transfers adaptive information. 
Interactor is what interacts with the environment, working as a vehicle 
for the replicator (Dawkins, 1976), and causing “replication to be 
differential” (Hull 1988, p. 408). Institutions, such as individual habits 
and organizational routines, are usually considered to be socio-economic 
replicators, and firms are considered to be socio-economic interactors 
(Hodgson and Knudsen, 2004). 
Regarding them as result of mere biological analogy, Stoelhorst (2008) 
rejects both descent and replication concepts. However, he agrees on the 
need of generalizing Darwinism, and for this purpose he proposes a 
multi-level selection approach that, following Dopfer and Potts (2004), 
brings about layers of adaptive complexity. Quite the opposite, Levit et 
al. (2011) report an incompleteness of Darwinism itself as a theoretical 
system, and question the entire GD top-down research strategy. Whereas 
this objection concerns whether or not only one “Darwinism” in biology 
exists and, accordingly, whether or not it is allowed to generalize it, other 
objections concern the claimed Hodgson and Knudsen’s version of the 
GD. It is the case of Pelikan (2011), who proceeds in a different, 
inductive fashion and, in order to account for phenomena like 
cooperation, reasons in terms of development rather than in terms of 
evolution. In spite of his methodological objections, however, Pelikan 
(2012) himself admits that his contribution does not exceed the 
boundaries of a generalization of Darwinism. 
 
 
3. The human intentionality objection 
 
A more radical kind of objections depends on which role has to be recognized 
to human intentionality in the evolutionary process. The problem is whether 
human agency can elude the Darwinian evolutionary logic by virtue of its own 
peculiarities. Human beings are self-aware, prescient, and act intentionally in 
order to reach specific goals. Being able to foresee the outcomes of a selection, 
for example, they could try to avoid them by disturbing the process. So, human 
beings would intentionally modify certain habits whereby they were aware 
that, otherwise, those habits would end up disappearing. Of course, they are not 
able to guide future outcomes with a deterministic degree of certainty: nobody 
can exactly foresee or lead the outcome of a complex system. Nonetheless, the 
human intentionality can actually affect evolutionary results and, sometimes, 
even in the desired direction. Thus, human behaviour would seem able to 
violate the chance and necessity mechanism, which excludes any form of 
teleology. To this end, human beings can also experience or learn something 
during their lifetime and pass it on before dying. So, they can transfer to the 
next generation something that they did not have at the time of their birth. 
Consequently, even if socio-economic reality is subjected to evolutionary 
forces, such forces could be meant as non-Darwinian: the teleologically 
oriented human agency would interrupt the blind chain of events, which is 
usually assumed to be characteristic of Darwinism. 
This fundamental remark leads to two distinct objections. On one hand, it leads 
to the idea that socio-economic evolution is Lamarckian rather than Darwinian 
(Hirshleifer, 1977; Nelson and Winter, 1982 Rosenberg, 1982; David and 
Olsen, 1986; Metcalfe, 1994). On the other hand, such remark induces to claim 
that no generalization of Darwinism is possible, and that human intentionality 
would demand a completely different evolutionary scheme. 
At first glance, Lamarckism would actually appear to give an answer to the 
questions deriving from the human ability to intentionally acquire, modify, and 
transfer skills to the next generations. Conceiving Lamarckism as radically 
alternative to Darwinism prevents Darwinism from accommodating the 
“exception” that human intentionality would represent. The point is that 
Lamarckism is not, in the GD logic, an alternative to Darwinism: 
 
We accept the possibility, in the social if not the biological sphere, that 
some (social) phenotypes (or interactors) can affect their (social) 
genotypes (or replicators), just as firms can alter their routines […]. 
Contrary to a widespread view, Lamarckism and Darwinism are not 
mutually exclusive. (Hodgson and Knudsen, 2010, p. 65) 
 
 So, if Lamarckism and Darwinism are not mutually exclusive, then 
Lamarckian characteristics in the socio-economic world would not undermine 
a generalization of Darwinism that includes that world. Besides, in the GD 
view, at least in the Hodgson and Knudsen’s version, neither the non-randomic 
character of socio-economic variation would appear to be an obstacle: 
 
The volitional acquisition of characteristics is often contrasted to the 
allegedly blind or random mutations in some versions of Darwinism. 
However, Darwin himself never wrote of random mutations, and, in 
principle, core Darwinian principles are broad enough to accommodate 
both contrasting accounts. Furthermore, volition and randomness are 
neither mutually exclusive (think of the stock market) nor strictly 
necessary for Darwinian evolution to occur. (Hodgson and Knudsen, 
2010, p. 64, italic in original) 
 
A different and more demanding challenge to GD comes from the claim that 
human beings “have sufficient intelligence and incentives to anticipate and 
avoid selection effects” (Witt, 2004, p.128). In this approach, intelligence and 
incentives would originate a feedback between variation and selection. For 
example, humans can intentionally modify certain institutions in order to avoid 
that the axe of selection falls on them. Thus, the inception of human 
teleological attitude would undermine the Darwinian logic not, as in the 
previous case, because of the ability to acquire, modify, and pass on acquired 
traits, but due to the human peculiar ability to anticipate and avoid the 
outcomes of the evolutionary selection: 
 
In the presence of a systematic feedback, the distinction between 
variation and selection, which is a fundamental premise of the neo-
Darwinian theory, is no longer valid – a result that does not just live 
up to the expectations of Universal Darwinism. (Witt, 2004, p. 129) 
 
This approach, also known as Continuity Hypothesis (CH), does not refuse 
Darwinian evolution. On the contrary, it claims that human intentionality is 
itself an outcome of Darwinian evolution. In spite of such an ontological 
continuity, CH also claims that evolution of socio-economic reality, which 
radically depends on that intentionality, cannot be explained by Darwinian 
schemes due to the systematic feedback that intentionality gives rise to. The 
biological evolution, which characterizes living organisms and has led to the 
self-conscious and teleologically oriented human brain, can be explained in 
Darwinian terms. But the socio-economic evolution, which strictly depends on 
that brain, needs instead a different, non-Darwinian, scheme of explanation. In 
this view, continuity exists between these two phases of the evolutionary 
history, since those human abilities find their own origin in the pre-human 
biological evolution, but a deep discontinuity also occurs. This nominal 
contradiction did not go unseen to Hodgson and Knudsen (2010, p. 59), who 
remarked “[…] Witt ends up defending a good measure of discontinuity rather 
than continuity.” However, their teleological attitude allows humans to foresee 
future (evolutionary) outcomes with a given degree of probability, and their 
consequent choices can in turn cause a feedback of the selection step towards 
the variation one. Hodgson and Knudsen (2010, p. 58) reply by considering CH 
fully consistent with Darwinian principles albeit 
 
Witt claims that cultural evolution is driven by different mechanisms 
and principles than biological evolution. He therefore questions the 
relevance of the principles of variation, selection, and inheritance for 
understanding cultural evolution. 
 
The point is that GD is first of all a generalization of the three Darwinian 
evolutionary steps, and human intentionality actually causes a difference in the 
mutual relationships among such steps. This is something unknown to (pre-
human) evolutionary biology as teleology is. For this reason, advancements in 
the GD demand to account for such a discontinuity. Otherwise, in the better 
hypothesis, the differences between the two approaches would remain 
irreconcilable because ultimately it depends either on the semantic extent of 
terms as “variation” and “selection” or on whether to admit or not that a human 
exception exists, which prevents the Darwinian scheme to be applied to socio-
economic reality. 
The next section offers a perspective to overcome the GD versus CH contrast: 
CH gathers correctly that human teleological abilities constitute a 
discontinuity, and nonetheless it can be brought back into the boundaries of 
GD thanks to one of those auxiliary hypotheses that both sides focus on 
(Aldrich et al., 2008; Levit et al., 2011). 
 
 
4. The socio-economic environment 
 
The hypothesis this paper suggests is that human teleological intentionality has 
to be considered neither as an external force altering the Darwinian scheme nor 
as a mere agents’ attribute, ultimately not crucial for the extension of the core 
Darwinian principles to socio-economic domain. Rather, human intentionality 
has to be considered as a component of the environment of the socio-economic 
domain.
1
 As GD and CH agree, intentionality is an outcome of the Darwinian 
biological evolution. In addition, I suggest, it is the place where socio-
economic evolutionary events occur. In this view, human intentionality and 
teleological attitudes are something that socio-economic replicators like habits 
and routines have to comply with in order to survive and replicate. This 
approach acknowledges full human free will and is auxiliary to GD framework. 
Furthermore, it overcomes the variation-selection feedback objection by Witt, 
and reconciles such an objection and GD. 
In a very general meaning, the biological evolutionary environment is the 
complex place including physical, chemical, and biotic factors, where 
organisms live, where they have available sustenance and information, and 
which they interact with. At a more detailed level, such an environment shows 
some features that participate in the three steps of the evolutionary process, and 
which are very relevant for the aims of the current analysis. First of all, (a) the 
environment is the place where the replication happens. Next, (b) it can directly 
provide variations in the replicator: it is the case, for example, of genetic 
heritable mutations caused by chemical elements or radiation exposure. Also, 
(c) the environment can interrupt replication. By means of this, the 
environment selects which genes will be passed on and which will not, based 
on the rate of survival and reproduction of a phenotype. Finally, (d) the 
																																																								
1
 The human intervention, both intentional and unintentional, has also to be considered as a 
component of the biological environment. Nonetheless, the environmental role of human 
intentionality in the socio-economic domain is incomparably more pervasive than the one in 
the biological domain. 
biological environment, according to the hypothesis of the primordial soup, 
provided the conditions for the primigenial forms of life to appear. 
The aim of this section is to show that all these four features repeat in the 
socio-economic environment, carried out by both intentional and unintentional 
human agency. The consequence is the hypothesis that human minds belong, in 
their mutual relationships, to the socio-economic environment. We may be 
brought to think that the human intentionality is something able to intervene in 
(and possibly able to alter) the evolutionary process as such. This is the CH 
approach. Differently, I consider the human intervention as something where 
the evolutionary events occur. If this change of perspective is accepted, the 
feedback between variation and selection disappears: the evolutionary path of 
socio-economic replicators proceeds with its own course regardless human 
intervention. This course will face human intervention just as any other 
environmental element that is able to house replication, to introduce variation, 
and to set disappearance of replicators off. 
(a) Consider the replication of behavioural rules.
2
 This kind of institution is an 
example of socio-economic replicator. Both imitation (intentional and 
unintentional) and teaching (intentional) are examples of socio-economic 
replication mechanisms. What does this replication consist in? It results in the 
transfer of the rule from a human mind to another one. In a sense, the replicator 
employs human minds to do copy of itself, just as an organism employs the 
ecosystem to replicate: both the matrix and its copies live in the same 
environment, the human minds, where they replicate. Importantly, while the 
biological agents replicate in just one biosphere (or, more precisely, in just one 
biome), the minds we are considering have to be at least two, and this can be 
considered as specificity, a sort of sub-hypothesis for the socio-economic 
domain.
3
 The behavioural rule can be learned by imitation without the 
																																																								
2 
For the sake of simplicity, the line of reasoning concerns only institutions as behavioural 
rules, but it can be extended to the rules of thought without running in contradiction.
 
3 
This	 is	 the	 reason	 for	which	we	 need	 to	 consider	 the	 human	minds	 in	 their	mutual	
relationships.	 One could think that, just because more than one, each mind could be 
considered as the interactor of the rule/institution. However, the mind where the rule transfers 
to, existed already before the replication. Therefore, the mind cannot be considered as an 
interactor because the interactor cannot pre-exist to its own replicator. Differently, the complex 
intervention of a full intentionality. This is the case of a specific accent that 
pools the people of a certain place together. Usually, the people do not notice 
their own inflection of pronunciation. They learned it unintentionally. In the 
same manner, we can acquire many other behavioural rules unintentionally, 
just by following other people. Alternatively, a rule can be intentionally 
learned or taught. The first is the case of somebody who learns the custom of a 
new community; the second is the case of a mother who teaches the child to 
walk on the zebra crossing, thus, intentionally replicating this behavioural rule 
in the mind of the daughter. 
(b) In both polar cases, intentional or unintentional, as well as in all the 
intermediate cases, the replicative outcome can ideally be either faithful to its 
own matrix or different. When it is different, variations arise. What is specific 
of the socio-economic domain is that variations can intervene according to two 
ways
4
, depending on whether the human teleological intentionality intervenes 
or not. The unintentional variations of the rule may depend on errors in the 
replicative mechanism just as it usually occurs in the biological domain. For 
example, an unintentional misunderstanding in the imitation of a custom may 
originate a new and different custom. Variations can also be intentionally 
introduced. It is the case of a variation inserted in a routine in order to improve 
its outcomes. As the biological environment can directly intervene in 
modifying the DNA, so the human mind can directly intervene to modify a rule 
of behaviour regardless of whether the intention will end well or not; viz. 
independently from either the attempt of modification will be a success or not, 
and independently from either the modification itself will reach the desired 
result or not. Only afterwards the selection step will set the destiny of that 
modification. We need to resist the temptation to exclude the feasibility of the 
natural evolution scheme due to the conscious and teleological orientation of 
																																																																																																																																																																										
of the human minds, just as the biological environment, exists before the copying process. In 
this sense, it is maybe arguable that a socio-economic interactor is the single human agency 
that “expresses” that rule. So, for example, the single behaviour adapting to the rule could be 
meant as an interactor of that specific rule/replicator, which is nested in the mind of the subject. 
Just thanks to this single behaviour, moreover, the replication is possible via imitation. 
4  
According, also, to each intermediate element of the countless possibilities included 
between these two extremes: see below in this subsection. 
the free human mind. In the considered case, the human mind remains free, 
conscious, and also teleologically oriented but, from the replicator point of 
view, the human intervention is just an external source of direct variation like 
radiations are for the DNA. Obviously, there is a quantitative difference 
between the two cases. The variation of the biological replicator that directly 
depends on the environment is a rather infrequent possibility, differently from 
what happens in the socio-economic domain. However, again, this quantitative 
difference can be ascribed to the intrinsic differences between the two domains. 
Rather, what is very relevant is that human intentional minds can produce 
direct variations in institutions just like biological environment can produce 
direct variations in DNA. In the socio-economic field, either unintentional 
variations or intentional but unsuccessful attempts to improve replicator may 
prevent it to do copy of itself. Such inability may also depend on an arisen 
environmental obstacle. 
c) In our approach, such an obstacle may also be represented by a human 
intervention that suppresses the replicator. In this case the environment 
changes in the sense that human intervention places some kind of obstacle to 
the replicator survival and spreading. The obstacles depending on human 
intervention can again be either unintentional or intentional.
5
 As an example of 
human unintentional obstacle, consider the case of a technological change: the 
introduction of some forms of automation can force the agents to shelve old 
routines. The routines cannot replicate due to an obstacle that neither is the 
accidental consequence of a failed attempt to improve them, nor it has been put 
there intentionally to suppress them. Anyway, such an obstacle exists and 
depends on human intervention, which in the example reveals itself by a 
technological transformation, and ends up impeding those routines to replicate 
and survive. 
An example of intentional obstacle recurs instead when legal sanctions succeed 
to suppress certain behavioural patterns. In this case, a change in the mind (the 
fear of the consequence related to maintaining a given behaviour) corresponds 
																																																								
5 
Obviously enough, the intentional obstacle could be unsuccessful and the rule could proceed 
to replicate. 
to an environmental change hostile to survival and replication. This change is 
not the undesired effect of other (maybe intentional) choices, but it is precisely 
the one that the conscious design of a legislator aims to. For whatever reason a 
rule suffers the selective cut, the mechanism remains the same of the biological 
domain: some obstacle in the environment impedes either survival or 
replication. 
Thus far, I described the two intentional-unintentional polar characteristics of 
the human mind as socio-economic environment. Note that such characteristics 
correspond to the two systems of Kahneman (2003). As it is well known, the 
system 1 includes all the basically automatic behaviours, and the system 2 
refers to the basically intentional behaviours. The human minds, meant as the 
whole of the two systems, and in mutual relationship, are components of the 
socio-economic environment. We concentrated on the functioning of system 2, 
which appears to be more problematic because able to cause the feedback that 
we talked about in the previous section. More in general, we may claim that the 
system 1 is the sub-environment where unintentional replication, variation, and 
selection happen, whereas the system 2 is the sub-environment where 
intentional replication, variation, and selection happen. The boundaries 
between intentional and unintentional behaviours are obviously fuzzy, meaning 
that the two polar cases (in all the three features so far considered) are only the 
extremes of a continuum, which includes infinite intermediate cases. However, 
the paper focused only on the two polar cases, resting on the premise that the 
better way to start understanding a continuum is to study its extremes. 
(d) Finally, the hypothesis of the human mind as socio-economic environment 
is also coherent with the problem of the origin of the institutions-replicators. In 
parallel to the hypothesis of the primordial soup, which originated the 
conditions for the spread of life on Earth, we may maintain an environmental 
origin of institutions. After all, where do primal rules arise from, either in the 
spontaneous or designed forms, if not in the human mind?  
These four characteristics, which environment shows in the biological domain, 
are therefore characteristics that the human mind shows. This is why we can 
conclude that, from the “replicator point of view”, the human mind (in its 
entire range from the perfectly unintentional to the completely intentional 






Human intentional teleological volition represents the main obstacle to 
Generalize Darwinian framework and to directing it to socio-economic domain. 
The reason is that human mind is able not only to foresee future evolutionary 
outcomes but also to alter socio-economic replicator in order either to promote 
or to impede their spread. According to CH approach, these abilities would 
give rise to a feedback between variation and selection, which would 
undermine the Darwinian logic. This approach rests on the idea that human 
intentionality can compete with Darwinian forces in order to orient the 
evolutionary outcomes. This paper changes perspective and suggests 
considering human intentionality (and, more in general, minds in their mutual 
relationships) as a part of socio-economic evolutionary environment, namely as 
the place where replication, variation, and selection happen. This hypothesis 
can be considered as one of the auxiliary hypotheses needed to carry 
Generalized Darwinism to the socio-economic domain specificities. 
Furthermore, such hypothesis reconciles GD and CH because it admits a 
singularity in the inception of human mind but reconnects such singularity to a 
metatheoretical Darwinian framework: the human beings’ appearance on Earth 
produces a discontinuity in the sense that, contextually, the socio-economic 
domain appears. Human intentional specificity does not alter the working of 
Darwinian scheme. Rather, it starts a new environment for a new domain of 
reality, which a Darwinian core of elements continues to apply to. 
Other studies are needed in order to account for a number of questions that 
remain open. First of all, the paper only examines the case of institutions as 
rules and not as organizations. Secondly, the idea of mind as environment 
demands to clarify what other elements the socio-economic environment 
consists of. Thirdly, further reflections are needed about the nature of 
interactors. One possibility is that the concrete behaviours complying the rule 
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